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The study aims to examine the concept of automatic fiscal stabilization in the context 
of macroeconomic adjustment policies. To this end, first a conceptual distinction 
between discretionary public adjustment policies and non-discretionary ones is 
achieved. Second, sufficient and necessary attributes for an automatic fiscal stabilizer 
are identified and examined, in order to obtain a definition of this instrument. The 
whole research approach is characterized by a logical and abstract way of thinking, to 
provide a general and non-contextual result. Finally, a general mechanism of action of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers is proposed, by introducing the basic concepts of action 
base and of action rate of such an instrument.
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How are emerging the non-discretionary adjustment policies? 
By public policy (PP) we generally understand a policy which verifies the following 
sufficient attributes
5:
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5 By sufficient attributes we understand those attributes which, verified by a given entity, in their 
totality, bestow a certain qualification/classification to that entity. 
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x  It is instrumented by a public institution/organisation licensed by law (usually 
through the fundamental legal law – the Constitution); 
x  It targets a public objective (set of objectives); 
x  The targeted public objective is relevant
6 at macroeconomic or macrosocial level; 
x  It has a permanent and continuous character; 
x  There is a procedure which starts the above-mentioned computational 
mechanism;
x  It contains a computational mechanism
7 (algorithmic) which describes the input-
output relation (or, more generally, the cause-effect relation) which accompanies 
its instrumentalisation; 
x  There is a procedure associated to the computational mechanism which starts 
this mechanism. 
The public policy can be clarified in terms of two fundamental criteria: a) the causal 
criterion; b) the formal criterion. According to the causal criterion, a PP can be of two 
types: a1) direct PP; a2) indirect PP. According to the formal criterion, a PP can also 
be of two types: b1) explicit PP; b2) implicit PP. We will briefly characterise the four 
types of PP. 
The direct PP determines the variation of the target variable directly, without the 
mediation of a command variable. For instance, the administrative setting of the price 
for a good or service (the reason for such intervention is of no interest here) simply 
means to modify that price
8.
The indirect PP determines the variation of the target variable indirectly, by mediation 
of a command variable. Some methodological clarifications are needed here: 1) we 
presume to have (accept) the theory which determines the causal relation between 
the variation of the command variable and the variation of the target variable; 2) the 
channel (mechanism) of transmitting the influence of the command variable to the 
target variable is known, observable, accessible and controllable (under all required 
aspects: amplitude of shock transmission, the different lags or leads, etc. - for 
instance, production of the taxation basis variation, also see the Laffer curve, or of the 
interest rate variation using the variation of the monetary policy interest rate). 
The explicit PP produces the variation of the target variable by a formal action 
(following a decision) of the institution/organisation responsible for the specific PP. For 
                                                          
6 The macroeconomic relevance of an objective can be evaluated from at least two points of 
view: a) as significance – the objective is significant for most of the population; b) as impact – 
the objective contains emerging principles with the role of drivers at the macroeconomic level. 
If these conditions are not met, or if they are met without a character of continuity, or are met 
partially, then the macroeconomic relevance is compromised. 
7 The computational characteristic of the mechanism means that it can be run on a universal
Turing machine. In other words, aspects such as mechanism comprehension or its integration 
within a certain axiology are not relevant here, although, no doubt, any PPA is generated by a 
theory which includes aspects of understanding or of values. 
8 A concrete example could be the determination of the minimal guaranteed wage paid in the 
national economy. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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instance, if the central bank observes an excessive appreciation of the exchange rate, 
than it can decide to decrease the minimal compulsory level of the bank reserves. Or, 
if the government notices that the proportion of the informal economy increased, then 
it can take the decision to decrease the fiscal pressure (or to make a convenient 
reorganisation of the general taxation). In other words, an explicit PP presumes to 
take formal decisions (an implement them) into the desired direction. 
The implicit PP obtains the variation of the target without an action (following a 
decision) of the institution/organisation responsible for the specific PP. How is this 
possible? - By implementing, in the causal mechanism, some institutional “devices” 
that start automatically, when certain conditions, preconceived, are verified and, 
therefore, produce the variation of the target variable. 
Here are some comments on what we proposed above. 
1. First, we should point out that the mentioned criteria function simultaneously, 
achieving a double characterisation of any concrete PP. In other words, a certain 
PP will be clarified both by the first criterion and by the second one. We would thus 
have, in principle, four distinct categories of PP: a) explicit direct PP; b) direct 
implicit PP; c) indirect explicit PP; indirect implicit PP. Let us notice, however, that 
the direct implicit PP is an inconsistency. Indeed, if the PP is direct, this means that 
the target variable is aimed directly, without the mediation of a command variable. 
Or, the implicit character implies exactly the existence of such a command variable 
which acts on the target variable. Therefore, according to the condition of 
consistency, we will have only three distinct types of PP: 1) direct explicit PP: PP-
de; 2) indirect explicit PP: PP-ie; 3) indirect implicit PP: PP-ii; 
2. an explicit PP is what we will subsequently call a discretionary PP, because, as 
mentioned above, it requires a “conscious” intervention of the institution/orga-
nisation responsible for the specific PP, at a certain moment, with an amplitude 
and in a way determined when the decision of intervention is taken (usually in a 
formal way); we therefore have two types of discretionary PP: PP-de, and PP-ie; 
3.  an implicit PP is what we will subsequently call a non-discretionary PP, because, 
as mentioned above, it does not require a “conscious” intervention of the 
institution/organisation responsible for the specific PP. According to the identified 
typology there is just one type of non-discretionary PP: PP-ii; 
4.  in agreement with the previous statements, both the discretionary PP and the non-
discretionary PP imply the pre-existence of a top-down algorithm
9. It follows that 
both the deliberate intervention and the automatic intervention on the target 
variable take place in a computational manner which excludes both the 
                                                          
9 By top-down algorithm we understand (in systems theory and particularly in the computational 
theory) an algorithm which contains the whole protocol followed by a universal Turing 
machine; the Turing machine itself cannot (although the programmer can, but we remain here 
within the top-down algorithms) modify this protocol by experience (or learning). On the 
contrary, an algorithm which allows this learning (thus, the modification of the protocol), by the 
Turing machine itself, during algorithm running, is a bottom-up algorithm. The logical 
consistency between the bottom-up algorithms and the emergence phenomena is readily 
obvious. Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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requirement for intuition (that is, of comprehension) and the need for an axiological 
evaluation (both are supposed to have been considered when the top-down 
algorithm was designed. We will subsequently revert on the characteristics of this 
algorithm.
By public policy of adjustment
10 (PPA) we understand that PP in which we will not find 
the direct character of the public intervention. According to what we determined 
above, it results that there can be two such PPA: PPA-ie, which is of discretionary 
type, and PPA-ii, which is of non-discretionary type. The best known PPA are those 
available to the government (fiscal-budgetary policy) or to the central bank (monetary 
policy), with the role and function of intervention in the market economic mechanisms 
in order to implement (induct, stimulate, maintain, correct, etc.) those economic, 
social, etc., processes and phenomena, supposed to facilitate the accomplishment of 
the fundamental objectives of the government and of the central bank. We will 
subsequently be interested only in PPA
11.
While, as mentioned, semantics plays no role in applying a PPA once the algorithm 
was designed, irrespective of whether there is a discretionary or non-discretionary 
algorithm, the syntax of PPA interventions is of decisive importance.  
Syntactically, we may have very different adjustment discourses.
First, there are simple adjustment discourses, and composed adjustment discourses. 
A simple adjustment discourse is that PPA intervention that is mono-typical: either a 
“de” intervention (de0 – de1 – de2 - … - dek), or an “ie” intervention (ie0 – ie1 – ie2 - … - 
iek), or an “ii” intervention (ii0 – ii1 – ii2 - … - iik). A composed adjustment discourse is 
that PPA intervention that is poly-typical: a concatenation of different mono-typical 
interventions
12.
Second, there are atomic (or singular, meaning these are adjustment discourses 
including a single PPA intervention) adjustment discourses and molecular adjustment 
discourses. The latter can be of two categories: periodical (containing groups of PPA 
interventions that reappear periodically with the same configuration) and a-periodical
(containing groups of PPA interventions that do not appear twice). 
Third, it is important whether the initial intervention is discretionary or non-discretio-
nary. If the initial intervention is discretionary but subsequently involves only non-
discretionary interventions, this initial intervention can be called priming intervention 
                                                          
10 Let us mention that a public policy of adjustment can only be a macroeconomic policy (which 
is a policy with targets that are relevant at the macroeconomic level, even if most times the 
basic effects occur, or are intended to occur, at the microeconomic level). This is why the 
macroeconomic policies of adjustment (particularly the monetary policy available to the central 
bank and the fiscal policy available to the government) must be correlated causally, 
structurally and functionally within the so-called mix of fiscal-monetary policies, so that the 
aggregation of the effects at the macroeconomic level may lead to the convergent 
accomplishment of the set targets. 
11 Obviously, according to what we stated:  PP PPA  .
12 The syntactic rules available to formulate the poly-typical adjustment discourses are, of 
course, incorporated within the mentioned top-down algorithm and they depend, as shown, on 
the relevant (accepted) theory in the particular field. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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for the non-discretionary processes
13. If the initial intervention is non-discretionary but 
subsequently involves only discretionary interventions, this initial intervention can be 
called signalling message. A more meticulous analyst might extract many other 
classifications which may be conceptually, methodologically and even instrumentally 
interesting
14 but for the purposes of this paragraph we consider enough what we have 
already settled. 
Fourth, the more elaborate a PPA is (both conceptually, and methodologically or 
instrumentally), the more predominant the poly-typical adjustment discourses will be 
and the more complex they will be
15.
Therefore, by PPA structure we understand, in fact, the syntactic structure of that 
PPA. This is no coincidence if we consider that the mechanism for impulse 
transmission within the economy is eventually a matter of …syntax. Therefore, we 
notice that we have a logical equivalence between the mechanism of impulse 
transmission and PPA syntax. That is why, when we will discuss either of them, we 
may very well discuss the other one, mutatis mutandis. This qualitative result is 
particularly important methodologically because it allows us to shift the focus of our 
analysis from one aspect to another, as it serves better or more directly the purpose of 
the analysis.
In conclusion, we must say that the title of this paragraph is somehow forced because, 
as we saw from the above developments, we cannot speak of an antinomy or 
inconsistency between the discretionary and non-discretionary interventions, since 
they may belong to the same adjustment discourse according to the existing 
institutional logic. 
The special case of the fiscal policy
16
As seen until now, the two categories of PPA – explicit indirect, which is discretionary, 
and implicit indirect, which is non-discretionary – refer to any public policy of 
                                                          
13 This is the typical case for the less developed stages of the public policies of adjustment (we 
do not consider the situation in which the initial discretionary intervention is followed only by 
discretionary interventions too). As the public policies of adjustment improve, the initial 
interventions will be predominantly non-discretionary, followed by non-discretionary 
interventions too. 
14 For instance, the case of the circularly adjustment discourse, which extends its periodicity to 
the initial intervention, too. 
15 We propose to determine the complexity of a poly-typical discourse of adjustment according 
to the number of involved mono-typical discourses. 
16 Some analysts distinguish between the fiscal policy – the set of norms, institutions and 
procedures which ensure the dynamics of the real economy in terms of fiscal revenue (more 
generally, of the public revenue) – and the budgetary policy – by which we understand the 
assembly of norms, institutions and procedures which ensure the dynamics of the real 
economy in terms of budgetary expenditure (more generally, of the public expenditure). As far 
as we are concerned, by fiscal policy we understand both the aspects related to the public 
revenue and the aspects related to the public expenditure. In other words, the expressions 
“fiscal policy” and “budgetary policy” are considered to be perfectly replaceable.  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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adjustment, without any specific area of intervention. In this respect, the two 
categories of PPA may refer both to the monetary and to the fiscal policy
17.
Any PPA has a specific set of instruments with which it carries its interventions in the 
economy. Some of these instruments are rather administrative, others rather 
economic. There is, thus, a problem of how much discretionary is a PPA, more 
precisely, which is the threshold of discretionarity of a PPA over which the particular 
PPA is characterised as discretionary and below which it is characterised as non-
discretionary. The question is justified because it is obvious that, in an empirical PPA 
(actually applied in the economy), some instruments may increase the level of 
discretionarity, other may decrease it. On the other hand, the instruments of a PPA 
can be extremely different in many respects, so that this non-homogeneity 
(methodological, technological, of mechanism, of measurement) makes it impossible 
to determine a “mean” or some other such aggregate indicator of discretionarity. 
Within this context, the introduction of a “measure” of the level of discretionarity of the 
entire PPA seems impossible. Therefore, the method which we will use is to identify a 
minimal list of the most important instruments of a given PPA and to examine each 
such instrument with the view to evaluate whether it acts discretionary or non-
discretionary. Of course, this is an objective of classification and it will not be the 
purpose of this paragraph, or of the overall study. We will rather be interested in 
determining the institutional and mechanism conditions which ensure that a particular 
instrument (the more important ones, or even all of them) of a PPA may function in a 
discretionary or even non-discretionary manner. This approach seems more 
accessible methodologically, but less relevant theoretically and conceptually.
(a)  PPA features - Fiscal policy 
By PPA named fiscal policy we understand the assembly of norms, institutions and 
procedures aimed to administer, from the perspective of the public authorities, the 
macroeconomic equilibrium in the real economy, the control of taxation rates and 
governmental expenditure. The main characteristics of this public policy of adjustment 
are:
-  It is a governmental prerogative (mainly through the Ministry of Public 
Finance);
-  It is applicable to the market of goods and services (i.e. to the real economy); 
- It concerns predominantly the adjustment of internal macroeconomic 
imbalances18 ; 
-  It is quite rigid: its modification is difficult and rigid (the budgetary process is 
quite complicated and bureaucratic); 
-  It is quite efficient: it is enforced by law; 
                                                          
17 We consider only the two PPAs because they are, by far, the most important policies of this 
kind.
18 It is difficult to distinguish between the fiscal policy and the trade policy: although customs 
duties are a category of indirect taxes (which thus belong to the fiscal policy), they are 
instruments for the protection of the economic borders (belonging thus to the trade policy). 
However, if we consider the simple Keynesian model (referring to the closed economy), we 
may say that the fiscal policy regards the internal macroeconomic equilibrium. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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-  It has an immediate effect (legally, there is no lag between the enforcement of 
a fiscal norm and the effects of this norm)19; 
-  It is strictly and totally legally regulated (there are no persuasive fiscal 
instruments, just regulatory fiscal instruments). 
(b) Relation between the discretionary and non-discretionary character in 
the fiscal policy 
x Similarities
20:
-  Both categories presume a theoretical framework (an explanatory paradigm) 
to justify them reasonably; 
-  Both categories presume a procedure; 
- Both categories are designed consciously and pragmatically by the 
responsible public institution; 
-  Both categories are indirect (see the considerations under para. 2.1.); 
-  The efficacy of the fiscal policy instruments is not influenced by their 
discretionary or non-discretionary nature. 
x Dissimilarities:
-  The discretionary instrument of the fiscal policy is activated both following the 
signalling message (see para. 2.1.) and without it, based on preset goals of 
the responsible institution21, while the non-discretionary instrument of the 
fiscal policy is activated by the autonomous reaching of  set threshold of the 
controlled economic phenomenon; 
-  The discretionary instrument of the fiscal policy has an explicit character, 
while the non-discretionary instrument of the fiscal policy has an implicit 
character;
-  The rigid character of the discretionary fiscal policy is permanent, while the 
rigid character of the non-discretionary fiscal policy is displayed only during 
fiscal policy design, not enforcement (functioning); 
-  In principle, the discretionary fiscal policy does not generate lags between rule 
enforcement and the production of the normative effects, while the non-
discretionary fiscal policy displays a certain lag generated by the necessity of 
reaching a critical threshold (mass) that activates the non-discretionary fiscal 
policy.22;
                                                          
19 Of course, we do not take into consideration the cases of voluntary non-payment of the duties 
to the budget, although this phenomenon too takes place under the fiscal policy (tax evasion is 
one of the problems that, at certain intervals, may become the main competence of the fiscal 
policy).
20 These are common characteristics, additional to the ones stated under letter (a) of this 
paragraph.
21 In the case of Romania, such activation was the implementation of the single tax rate for the 
personal and corporate income, starting in 2005. 
22 We have to accept here, however, the existence of an original persuasive characteristic of the 
non-discretionary fiscal policy. The sui generis nature of this attribute of persuasiveness  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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-  The discretionary fiscal policy creates its own path23, while the non-
discretionary fiscal policy will use the “path” “constructed” when the specific 
fiscal policy was designed24; 
-  The non-discretionary fiscal policy requires a finer “square grid” (more taxes 
or classes of governmental expenditure25) or larger amplitudes (higher taxing 
rates or higher rates of governmental expenditure allocation) then the 
discretionary fiscal policy, in terms of fiscal mechanism design; these 
characteristics don’t aim just to increase the fiscal efficiency, but they may 
also be necessary solutions to prime a non-discretionary fiscal policy 
(meaning that below a certain threshold of this “square grid” or amplitude, the 
non-discretionary fiscal policy is inefficient26); 
x Interconditioning:
-  The actual fiscal policy will have a syntax which contains both discretionary 
and non-discretionary components; 
-  By the priming intervention, a discretionary act may start one or several non-
discretionary acts while, through a signalling message, a non-discretionary act 
may start one or several discretionary acts27; 
-  The „success” of the non-discretionary instrument of fiscal policy (in terms of 
reaction time, efficacy, cost reduction, etc.) may, in time, increase the level of 
“non-discretionarity” of the fiscal policy as a whole28; in other words, the 
                                                                                                                               
results from the fact that the non-discretionary fiscal policy too is designed as imperative norm 
(therefore this is not a “hard” persuasiveness as in the case of the monetary policy, for 
instance).
23 It is interesting here the metaphor of the tank: the tank is a machine which creates its own 
path which it needs (the caterpillar carried by the machine itself builds the road as and how it 
is required).It would be interesting to develop this idea within the context in which the 
European construction based on catching-up seems to fail, and a worm hole philosophy is 
needed (the tank metaphor is such a worm hole). 
24 The interesting problem of the path dependence appears here. A discretionary fiscal policy 
has a quite high path autonomy (which it states during the specific intervention), while the non-
discretionary fiscal policy doesn’t have this autonomy. In other words, if with the discretionary 
fiscal policy the initial conditions are not determined causally (they may simply be changed 
during the intervention), with the non-discretionary fiscal policy, this dependence on the initial 
conditions is crucial. 
25 See also the issue of the fiscal capillarity, which may be an extremely efficient “replacer” of 
the fiscal pressure (amplitude). 
26 The distinction between efficacy and efficiency is useful within this context. 
27 A sophisticated syntax of the fiscal policy might, of course, concatenate, logically and 
chronologically, a non-discretionary act with another non-discretionary act. The most general 
case is, of course, that in which the discretionary and non-discretionary acts of fiscal policy link 
according to the accepted economic logic. However, a control is required on the dynamics of 
the real economy “directed” by non-discretionary acts in order to reach the proposed targets, 
but this can be ensured by periodical reports of fiscal policy elaborated by the Ministry of 
Public Finance. 
28 We can notice here the appearance of auto-poiesis, which is the ingredient which gives the 
fiscal policy (and any PPA) the characteristics of a vivid logic system, so important in the 
institutional designing, functioning and evolution, in general. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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syntax of the fiscal policy will include an increasing number of non-
discretionary components (“words”) in its discourse; 
-  the discretionary fiscal policy may create institutional structures and economic 
behaviours (fiscal, particularly) which may thereafter become the field for 
implementing a non-discretionary fiscal policy. This relation of causality is, in 
our opinion, desirable. 
What is an automatic fiscal stabilizer (AFS)? 
As shown in the previous paragraphs, a non-discretionary PPA (an indirect implicit 
one) must comprise an institutional device which enters into action without any 
decision or deliberation of the public structure responsible for the particular PPA. We 
will subsequently refer only to the fiscal policy as species of public policy of 
adjustment, and, consequently, to the automatic fiscal stabilizers
29, as species of 
automatic stabilizers. 
The institutional device
30 mentioned above will be called automatic fiscal stabilizer
31
(AFS). The following comments will serve to clarify the concept of automatic fiscal 
stabilizer:
a)  AFS has an exclusively normative character. This means that an AFS cannot just 
appear from the logic of the economic market (although certain economic 
phenomena can inspire the fiscal normative authority to design and implement 
some AFS
32);
b)    AFS has the specific finality to reduce the volatility of the macroeconomic 
output
33. GDP volatility or oscillations may be generated by shocks (usually on the 
job offer, but any other shocks that influence, one way or another, the result of the 
                                                          
29 The recommendation of the design and implementation of automatic fiscal stabilizers within 
the mechanism of the fiscal policy is included in the Pact of Growth and Stability. 
30 We prefer to use here the expression of “institutional device” instead of instrument of fiscal 
policy because, for instance, if we accept the taxation rate to be a fiscal instrument, there is no 
way we can dissociate the progressive taxation rate from the single taxation rate: both are, of 
course, instruments of fiscal policy and yet their economic impact is completely different. 
Maybe we can accept the idea that the institutional fiscal device refers to a certain modality of 
the concerned fiscal instrument. 
31 Obviously, relying on our statements in the previous paragraphs that by fiscal policy we 
understand what other analysts understand by fiscal-budgetary policy, it results that the 
automatic fiscal stabilizer will refer both to the purely fiscal side and to the purely budgetary 
side of the concerned indirect and implicit public policy of adjustment. 
32 We must say, nevertheless, that such automatic stabilizers may appear and do appear within 
the economic process as such. Otherwise, if it were not so, the market failure would be total 
(for instance the communist economic doctrine presumed implicitly that the economic progress 
itself can not generate and maintain automatic stabilizers). The best known example is the 
phenomenon of market clearing (coincidence of the demand with the offer for an economic 
good, the price being generated by the respective balance). We must however notice that 
when we speak of public policies of adjustment (such as the fiscal policy), the normative 
nature (origin) of the automatic stabilizers is logically necessary. 
33 The macroeconomic output is measured by the current GDP indicator.  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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production function, must be taken into consideration
34). This stabilizing capacity, 
characteristic of an AFS, gives the name of the concerned institutional device
35;
c)  A  more general finality of the AFS is to absorb the asymmetrical shocks
generated necessarily by the functioning of a common monetary policy (which also 
is a public policy of adjustment), under the conditions in which the effects of this 
common policy are displayed in member states with distinct financial structures 
(channels with different parameters for monetary impulse transmission); 
d)  AFS does not have a symmetrical action, when it acts from the perspective of the 
available income, comparatively with the situation where it acts from the 
perspective of the expenditure: for instance, its efficacy is certain in the case of the 
governmental expenditure, but it is uncertain when it acts from the perspective of 
the income
36, because, if the multiplier of the governmental expenditure is 
produced entirely
37, the reduction in income due to the action of the AFS doesn’t 
produce a proportional modification of the consumption, therefore of the aggregate 
demand
38;
e)  AFS has, by definition, an, anti-cyclical
39 impact. It is important to mention here 
that AFS has only an anti-cyclical impact, while the discretionary measures of fiscal 
policy, even if they are anti-cyclical as finality, may also have pro-cyclical 
consequences (temporarily or concerning some segments of the fiscal matter); 
f)   AFS  increases the efficacy of the macroeconomic prediction (by reducing the 
                                                          
34 The “hard” expression of GDP volatility refers to the exceeding of the potential GDP by the 
actual GDP (for increasing) or to GDP decrease below the so-called CDP of constant 
occupation (for decreasing). The CDP of constant occupation is a concept quite difficult to 
instrument analytically, but it is suggestive from the perspective of ensuring a “smooth” 
trajectory of the GDP (also see Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley, “Saving 
Europe’s Automatic Stabilizers”, in National Institute Economic Review, November 1996). 
35 Empirical studies have shown, however, that the AFS may also have destabilising effects, for 
instance, in the case where the grounds of action (see below) of the AFS are not indexed to 
shocks (for instance, to the inflationist shock). 
36 For instance, in OECD countries, both the taxation and governmental expenditure act as 
automatic fiscal stabilizers. 
37 It is estimated that the multiplier of the aggregate demand (the absolute modification of the 
output to the modification of the one-digit aggregate demand) is diminished by the automatic 




D : the marginal inclination to reduce the consumption following the income tax 
W: the marginal rate of the income tax 
E : a coefficient which overtakes the crowding-out effect generated by the increase in the 
interest rate and in the prices (see also Cohen, D, Follette, G., “The automatic fiscal 
stabilizers: Quietly doing their thing”, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 2000). 
38 Thus, when AFS acts in the direction of increasing the income, the marginal inclination 
towards consumption decreases, while when AFS acts in the direction of increasing the 
income, the Duesenberry effect is produced. 
39 Hence the essential feature of the AFS of being a negative feed-back. On the other hand, a 
discretionary PPA (indirect and explicit) may be anti-cyclical, that is, it may have the nature of 
a negative feed-back, but in the latter case the due negative feed-back is explicit, deliberate, 
unlike the AFS in which it is implicit, automatic. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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incertitude of the concerned predictions). The mechanism is as follows: an AFS is 
always designed in terms of the fiscal policy purpose (final cause), which means 
that once we accept the theoretical paradigm within which such an AFS is 
conceived, its operationalization leads with great certitude to the variation of the 
target macroeconomic variable in the expected direction, and most times, 
amplitude
40.
g)  AFS is a structural instrument, unlike the discretionary decisions of fiscal policy, 
which are purely functional. This is an aspect of particular importance because the 
structural aspect gives the concerned instrument a fundamental property, its 
capacity to “control” with certitude
41 the dynamics of the phenomenon or process to 
which it is assigned. Although the structural character may also bestow another 
property – that of permanence – we are reserved in stressing it too much because, 
in principle, a discretionary decision may abolish any time the concerned AFS and 
may equally perpetuate or renew any discretionary decision; in other words, AFS 
may have the same properties of permanence as discretionary decision, therefore, 
this property doesn’t express a specific difference; 
h)  As mentioned before, AFS requires the design of an “institutional path” on which it 
runs (unlike the discretionary fiscal policy which creates this paths simultaneously 
with the discretionary decision of intervention, see the tank metaphor). This means 
that AFS is “path-dependent”, which entails that condition (usually, preponderantly 
economic) fulfilment is the efficient cause to start the considered automatic action; 
i)  AFS is characterised by a high efficacy (the efficacy of an action is, of course, 
something different than its certitude). By AFS efficacy we understand its property 
to achieve the purpose for which it was designed and introduced into the 
institutional mechanism of fiscal policy. AFS efficacy is diminished or even annulled 
(at the risk of destabilising pro-cyclical effects occurring) if AFSs are designed 
                                                          
40 This observation may be of a crucial importance in the paradigmatic rethinking of the 
economic modelling (prediction). For instance, for us it is obvious that in economy we don’t 
have actual predictions, but rather…retrodictions from the future towards the present. This 
statement is likely because, in a so-called economic prediction, we do not extrapolate the past 
and the present (that is, the movement law of the economic phenomenon, the initial 
conditions; would we do so, we would expose ourselves, directly, to the Lucasian critique) but 
we restore the process starting from the set purpose, that is from the future towards the 
present. In this respect, a economic prediction normative should have an enormous normative 
load (in fact, the economic prediction must be considered as closed in normative terms), which 
means it should project the process, chronologically, from the present towards the future 
leaving, in logic terms, from the future towards the present. 
41 The word „certitude” is essential here because the discretionary decisions of fiscal policy too, 
can modify (or may attempt to modify) the structure of the particular economic phenomenon or 
process, but only in the moment or starting with the moment when they are implemented. 
Therefore, we are not sure whether the responsible public authority will react to the signals 
from the economy by deciding in a discretionary manner on the changes of structure deemed 
necessary (the authority may be incompetent or may have a political interest, for example, not 
to intervene). On the contrary, once AFS is implemented within the fiscal institutional 
mechanism, it becomes autonomous in relation to the particular public authority and its action 
is certain, as soon as the economic conditions allow its activation.  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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using distorted taxation data
42. Furthermore, AFS efficacy depends, directly 
proportionally, on the nominal and real rigidity of the economy. The last conclusion 
is logical, considering that AFS action is to make a physical comparison, like a 
lever: the rigidity of the lever ensures the presumed effect (which means that we 
have a potential trade-off between the distortions introduced by the nominal and 
real rigidities in the economy and AFS efficacy which relies exactly on these 
rigidities). After all, an AFS determines the private sector to do (in terms of 
changing its economic behaviour and sometimes even the criterion of economic 
behaviour) what the government cannot convince it to do. In terms of quality, 
efficacy is also a logical consequence of the structural nature of the AFS, and so is 
the certitude. In terms of quantity, efficacy is a function of two parameters: 1) the 
rate of action – the intensity at which AFS updates its programmed action; 2) the 
basis of action – the economic support on which the rate of action is exerted. Let 
us examine the two components, while making some logical and methodological 
considerations
43:
1. The rate of action (k ) refers to the “step” which AFS takes once all the “path” 
conditions are fulfilled, which starts automatically its action. For instance, if we take 
an AFS that acts on the income , such as progressive taxation of the personal 
income and/or of the corporate income, the rate of action is described by the 
amount with which the taxation rate changes from a level of incomes to another
44;
2. The  basis of action (B ) refers to the interval of the “action cell” that has a certain 
rate of action; 
3. The  quantitative dimension of AFS efficacy (E) refers to the product between the 
rate of action and the basis of action:  B k E    
45. One can observe immediately 
that the rate of action and the basis of action are replaceable
46. In this case we 





Rms 0 k dB B dk 0 dE      o      o  
                                                          
42 Any public norm having the effect to cut down consumer surplus is regarded as creating 
distortions.
43 It seems, for instance, that AFS efficacy increases by the size of the state (a larger state 
implies, necessarily, larger bases of action but, for of budgetary equilibrium reasons, it may 
also imply higher rates of action) (see also Barrell, R., Pina, A.L., How important are automatic 
stabilizers in Europe? A stochastic simulation assessment, European University Institute, 
WPECO nr. 2/2000). 
44 We observe here the necessarily discrete character of the rate of action. We will also notice, 
at the same time, another property according to which there is, on the one hand, an 
administrative constraint (fiscal revenue administration) concerning the number of “action 
cells” (the income levels in our example above), while on the other hand, there is an economic 
constraint concerning the actual size of the rate of action (see the Laffer curve). 
45 The negative algebraic sign shows the reversed direction of AFS action on the controlled 
economic variable in relation to its autonomous variation.
46 According to the case, the minimal and maximal thresholds of this replaceability must be 
examined by setting economic conditions. In our opinion, these economic conditions must be 
sustainable.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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where: Rms is the marginal rate of substitution between the rate of action and the 
basis of action; 
Figure 1 
Indifference curve of AFS efficacy 
j)   In relation to AFS we introduce the concept of AFS granularity which refers to the 
finesse of the “square grid” of both the rate of action and basis of action. The finer 
the two “square grids” are, the smaller AFS granularity is, and vice versa. AFS 
granularity is important in terms of the sensitiveness of AFS reaction to the change 
of the economic conditions, which is, as mentioned earlier, its efficient cause. Just 
as we have replaceability between the rate of action and the basis of action of an 
AFS, the same way we have replaceability between the granularity of the rate of 
action and the granularity of the basis of action of an AFS. It is, of course, another 
problem if AFS efficacy depends more on a granularity or on another factor. A 
conclusion in this respect might be interesting, but the issue will be resumed in 
another context of the study
47;
k)    According to the definition of a non-discretionary PPA and of the institutional 
device named AFS, this is an indirect and implicit entity. In terms of concrete 
action, however, AFS may have an impact characterized by an economic lag
48.
Developing the idea on the asymmetrical character of AFS action, we may say 
that, for instance, an AFS which acts on the governmental expenditure (such as 
the unemployment aid) does this without any economic intermediary on the 
aggregate demand, because the governmental expenditure is an explicit 
                                                          
47 In our opinion, this matter must be dealt with rather empirically than theoretically, meaning it 
represents a contingent property rather than a necessary one. 
48 This is not a temporal lag, because any AFS acts “instantly” once the conditions forming its 
efficient cause are fulfilled, but an economic lag, meaning a lag referring to the mechanism of 
AFS action transmission onto the command variable which it must modify (the economic lag is 
generated by the economic theory acknowledged to govern the specific economic process.  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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component of the aggregate demand. On the other hand, an AFS acting on the 
private consumption (another part of the aggregate demand) will first modify the 
available income which, in turn, will modify (for instance through the intermediation 
of the marginal inclination towards consumption) the private consumption. We deal 
here with an economic lag. We should therefore probably speak of non-mediated
AFS (AFS target being a component of the aggregate demand or of the aggregate 
offer), and of mediated AFS (AFS target being an economic variable characterized 
by a certain economic lag behind the final component of the aggregate demand or 
of the aggregate offer, according to the case); 
l)   The substitution effects mentioned above (both between the rate of action and the 
basis of action) and between the granularities of the two) may act as a sui-generis
AFS (we will resume this issue). 
The 12 characteristics of the institutional device named AFS will help us to identify the 
necessary and sufficient attributes of such a device. 
Based on the above, we may say that an AFS is a device of institutional type, or 
normative origin, with structural character, with macroeconomic sphere, with anti-
cyclical action and with implicit (automatic) start, whose purpose is to reduce the 
volatility of the macroeconomic output (GDP). 
The logical structure of an AFS 
We tried previously to define and characterize an AFS. Based on those considerations 
we try further to identify the list of the necessary and sufficient attributes of an AFS, 
and using this logical basis, to describe the mechanism (or classes of mechanisms, 
according to the case) by which the AFS sends its stabilizing impulse to the 
component (final target) of the aggregate demand (or offer, according to the case). 
Logically, we are first interested to determine the attributes (or predicates) sufficient 
for a certain abstract construct to be considered AFS. Second, we have to examine if 
the multitude of the sufficient predicates of an AFS is equal (meaning that it contains 
the same predicates) with the multitude of the necessary predicates
49. Third, we have 
to describe the mechanism (or classes of mechanisms) involved in the process of 
automatic fiscal stabilization. Let us denote by *  the abstract construct “candidate” to 
the qualification of AFS. 
(a)  The sufficient attributes of a generic AFS 
We consider that there are 5 sufficient predicates for an AFS, as follows: 
1) * is an institutional construct, meaning it is generated in a normative manner.
This an obvious attribute, sufficient by nature, because if it is not met, we may 
have self-stabilizing mechanisms (also based on the principle of the negative 
                                                          
49 It is possible, but not compulsory, that the multitude of the necessary predicates is more 
comprehensive than the multitude of the sufficient predicates, with the first multitude including 
the second one (see also the study Sustainable sources of financing, worked out by CFMR in 
2007, in which a sustainable source of financing generates new necessary predicates 
compared to the sufficient predicates), but it is at least equal to it. This excludes thus the 
situation in which the intersection of the two multitudes is not equal with the multitude of the 
sufficient predicates. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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feed-back) but generated by the economic process itself. As shown previously, 
this is in contradiction with the fact that the AFSs are discussed within a PPA; we 
denote this sufficient attribute (predicate) by  I S ;
2) *  is a structural construct– a construct with a permanent character and with 
continuous action
50. The argument for the sufficient nature of this predicate is 
the following: being a construct that must behave in a non-deliberative (automatic) 
manner, this trait can only be accomplished if * is a component part of the 
targeted economic process, being structurally endogenous
51. If it were not so, 
then its activation would require the evaluation of the efficient cause fulfilment 
and, subsequent to this evaluation, it would require a deliberative decision of 
activating its specific action (which is exactly the way a fiscal policy discretionary 
measure is activated); we denote this sufficient predicate by  S S ;
3) *  is a macroeconomic construct, meaning its action is relevant to the dynamics 
of the macroeconomic variables. Although the Lucasian critique
52 on 
macroeconomic modelling directed the economists (particularly the 
econometricians) towards researching the microeconomic basis of the macro 
economy, and although * acts effectively at the microeconomic level, the 
relevance of this action is always macroeconomic (reducing the volatility of the 
macroeconomic output – GDP). This predicate has the nature of a sufficient 
predicate because * construct does not verifies the specific predicate, the 
purpose of the construct – to reduce the volatility of the macroeconomic output – 
does not become actual
53; we denote this sufficient predicate by  M S ;
4) * is anti-cyclical
54, meaning that it acts in the reverse direction of the controlled 
variable variation. This predicate too, is clearly sufficient in nature, because if we 
                                                          
50 Here, the term “continuous” does not have the connotation of the continuous character as 
opposed to the discrete  character; it has rather the connotation of ensuring the action each 
time the efficient cause is fulfilled, avoiding thus “void actions”, failing to fulfil the efficient 
cause.
51 We want the reader to know that by this we do not mean at all that * is an endogenous 
(resulting) variable of the respective economic process logic model. We should rather consider 
that *is a control parameter (it cannot be a variable because the predicate set it from the very 
beginning as institutional, that is normative) or, better said, a gap analyzer (see Appendix 1 of 
the study). 
52 We do not accept the Lucasian critique on the grounds that the phenomenon of emergence 
which takes place at the macroeconomic level makes the microeconomic analysis irrelevant 
(maybe not so much in contingent-pragmatic terms, as in terms of the logical necessity). 
53 For instance, we may have institutional constructs with stabilizing effect at the company or 
microeconomic market level, but their final impact will not reduce GDP volatility. Although the 
theory of the microeconomic substantiation of the macroeconomy may argue that, in fact, by 
aggregation, such constructs may have the expected effect on the GDP, we reject these 
arguments on the ground of the composition fallacy and we claim that such a construct must 
aim from the very beginning, from its design, a macroeconomic impact. 
54 Let us observe that the anti-cyclical predicate is “stronger” than a possible predicate that 
would only hold the feed-back behaviour. As it is known, the feed-back may also act in a pro-
cyclic manner, in the case when the analysis of a black box output shows that accomplishing  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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would not impose this, any such institutional device will have an impact of 
increasing the variability of the structurally controlled variable (it would thus be 
pro-cyclical), undermining the very concept of AFS; we denote this sufficient 
predicate by  A S ;
the action of * is supra-proportional in relation to the variation of the controlled 
variable. This predicate obviously is sufficient in nature because if the action were 
proportional (or even worse, under-proportional), then the dynamics of the process 
would not be influenced, rather maintained, preserved
55 or even augmented in the 
pro-cyclical direction. The verification of the supra-proportionality predicate does not 
depend on the direction of variation of the controlled variable: if it increases, * will
reduce it more than it increases, and if it decreases, * will increase it more than it 
decreases. In other words, we are speaking here of a higher than the unit value of 
marginal variation of * . If we denote by dV the variation of the controlled variable 
generated by the evolution of the particular economic process, by  * dV  the variation 
of the controlled variable generated by the action of *  construct and by  m * the
marginal effect of * , then we must have the algebraic condition:  1
dV
dV
m      *
*
verified. This is, in fact, what might be called the AFS multiplier (Appendix 2 includes a 
diagram of the AFS multiplier). The measure by which AFS multiplier is higher than 
the unit is the measure of its efficacy
56; we denote this sufficient predicate by  P S ;
Let us observe that the mentioned predicates meet, taken two by two, the conditions 
of independence (none is the logical result of another), of consistency (none is 
contradictory to another) and of completeness (the simultaneous verification of the five 
predicates generates a * construct, which will function as an AFS, according to the 
statements previously made concerning the concept of AFS). 
Denoting by  S P  the multitude of the sufficient predicates, we may then 
write ^` P A M S I S S , S , S , S , S P   .
                                                                                                                               
the purpose of that black box requires a pro-cyclic variation of the input. By specifying an anti-
cyclical predicate we make sure that * always acts in the reverse direction of the controlled 
variable variation, towards smoothing the volatility, which is the very reason of an AFS. 
55 For instance, the single taxation rate for the personal and corporate income, introduced in 
Romania starting on January 1
st, 2005, doesn’t “reverse” the trend of GDP gap showing the 
tendency to become positive, because the variation of the amounts collected from incomes 
are proportional to the variation of the income, maintaining thus this inflationary trend. 
56 The extent to which the AFS multiplier is higher than the unit depends, obviously, on the 
granularity of the rate of action and on the granularity of the basis of action, as well as on the 
allowed level of replaceability between the two sizes and granularities. The logic and 
methodological relation between the concept of granularity and the concept of capillarity, 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs, is readily observable (the common element might be 
the concept of institutional square pattern). Institute of Economic Forecasting
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(b)  The necessary attributes of a generic AFS 
Let us examine now, the possibility that a * construct, which verified the five sufficient 
predicates and thus, conceptually became an AFS, might further generate other 
predicates that characterise it, predicates that are necessary, but not sufficient. We 
will consider each of these sufficient predicates and see whether, logically, they (each 
of them or combinations of them) generate necessarily other predicates. 
x Necessary predicates generated by individual sufficient predicates: 
Of the five individual sufficient predicates, the predicate of structurality generates 
(according to the precepts of systems theory) a necessary predicate which we will call 
functionality
57. This means that * is “sensitive” (according to its granularity, of 
course, either at the level of the rate of action, or at the level of the basis of action) to 
the variation of the variable it controls, so that when this variation exceeds a preset 
level, * activates spontaneously and produces the programmed change through its 
transmission mechanism. Why should this attribute have the nature of necessity? 
Because, once the * construct is included structurally in the process, it will be 
necessarily integrated in the functionality of the specific economic process, making 
thus the connection between the fulfilment of the efficient cause (the controlled 
variable exceeded the preset level) and the spontaneous, non-deliberative, activation 
of * . If we would not accept this impact of the sufficient predicate  S S , we would 
accept the fact that the dynamics of the economic process bears no influence on the 
*  construct, which would make this construct to fail its impact presumed by the very 
reason of being of an AFS; we denote this necessary predicate by  F N . The logical 
formulation of the generation of this predicate is:  F S N S o ;
x Necessary predicates generated by combined sufficient predicates: 
The sufficient predicates, anti-cyclical -  A S , and supra-proportional -  P S ,will
generate together a second necessary predicate of AFS, the inflexional predicate. By 
inflexionality we understand the property of AFS to reduce the variation speed of the 
controlled economic variable, creating, in mathematical terms, a point of inflexion in 
the trajectory of the controlled economic variable. The reduction of the variation speed 
of the controlled economic variable refers both to the situation in which this variation is 
positive (the variable increases) – in this case, AFS reduces the speed of increase – 
and to the situation in which the variation is negative (the variable decreases) – in this 
case, AFS reduces the speed of decrease. We denote this necessary predicate by 
I N . The logical formulation for the generation of this predicate is:  I P A N S S o  .
Figure 2 shows the way this necessary predicate is verified (using the example of the 
taxation regimes): 
                                                          
57 The term functionality has here its mathematical acceptation (functional dependence) and not 
its “civil” acceptation of functionality.  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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Figure 2 
Impact of the necessary predicate of inflexionality on the available 
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It is important to note that any sufficient predicate is also a necessary predicate
58.
Indeed, if a sufficient predicate is not found among the necessary predicates, it means 
that, in fact, it was either redundant, or contradictory to the other sufficient predicates. 
But, since we showed above that none of these cases occurs, it results that AFS 
actually has 7 necessary predicates, five of them coinciding with the sufficient 
predicates and two new ones, generated by the sufficient predicates, once they were 
joined within the construct * . In other words, if we denote by  N P  the multitude of 
necessary predicates and by 
N
N P  the multitude of new necessary predicates, then we 
can write successively:  ^` I F
N
N N , N P   , ^` I F P A M S I N N , N , S , S , S , S , S P   ,
N
N S N P P P    , S N S P P P    , I   
N




N N P P P    .
Figure 3 shows the logical diagram of the new necessary predicates: 
                                                          
58 The reciprocal – any necessary predicate also is a sufficient predicate – is not, obviously, 
true.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Figure 3 
Logical diagram of the new AFS necessary predicates generation 
(c) The transmission mechanism of the stabilization impulse of a generic 
AFS
We have introduced above the concept of efficient cause for AFS activation and we 
have also discussed about fulfilling the economic conditions that form this efficient 
cause. The description of the transmission mechanism of the stabilization impulse of 
an AFS means describing the way in which the conditions forming the specific efficient 
cause are fulfilled.
Since AFS is a structural institutional construct (see the sufficient predicate  S S ), it is 
sensitive to the modifications of structure produced within the controlled economic 
process (in fact, to the structural modifications occurring in the controlled economic 
variable). Therefore, we have to be sure that the controlled economic variable 
produces, together with its variation, such structural modifications. To do this we need 
an institutional framework of variation of the controlled economic variable, able to 
include thresholds, i.e., a certain institutional square grid. We will subsequently 
describe the abstract mechanism of AFS activation. 
Be it an economic variable 
j V  “fitted” with the institutional square grid “j”
 59. We 
denote by 
j
i t  a threshold “i” from the square grid set “j”. Suppose we have an AFS “q”, 
assigned functionally (see the new necessary predicate F N ) to the economic 
variable
j V , which we denote by
j
q SFA . Then, the new necessary predicate  F N
ensures the existence of an institutionalised procedure,  ) AFS , V (
j
q
j : , which functions 
automatically (there is no need for a deliberative decision exogenous to the particular 
economic process) and which, upon reaching threshold 
j
i t  by the economic variable 
j V , activates 
j
q AFS . Therefore, we may say that upon reaching threshold 
j
i t , we will 
                                                          
59 We also consider the set of institutional square grids because it is possible that in more 
sophisticated systems, the same economic variable (more precisely, macroeconomic) may be 
assigned to several such square grids (which can be in functional dependence on one 
another), so that an AFS can be activated by the fulfilment of the efficient cause by more than 
one square grid. For the time being, however, we limit ourselves to a simplified analysis in 
which we suppose we have just one institutional square grid.  Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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have modifications either in the rate of action of 
j
q AFS , or in its basis of action
60, or 
both in the rate of action and basis of action of AFS, so as to ensure the higher than 
unit value of the marginal 
j
q AFS  (of AFS multiplier). Let us admit that reaching 
threshold
j
i t  signifies a variation of the rate of action 
qj
i k  of
j
q AFS , which leads to a 
variation of 
j V  of the amount 
j
iV d . Then, the “amount of action” generated by 
j








i V d dk k V d E        *
61, on condition (imposed by the 
verification of the sufficient predicate  A S ): 0 dk
qj
i ! .
As shown in the previous paragraph, we may have mediated and non-mediated AFS. 
The abstract mechanism above referred to non-mediated AFS. The following 
mechanism changes occur in the case of the mediated AFS: we denote by 
jd
int V  an 
intermediary economic variable between AFS and the final economic variable
j V ,
located at the “institutional distance” “d” from the final economic variable (component 
of the aggregate demand or offer, according to the case). The problem with the 
mediated AFS is that the whole mechanism described above is applied in relation to 
jd
int V  , which, from AFS perspective, represents the final economic variable
62.
Subsequently, however, the new value of 
jd
int V  will act, according to the accepted 
theoretical models, on 
) 1 d ( j
int V
  and so on, until the final economic variable 
j 0 j
int V V  
is influenced. In agreement with the accepted theoretical models, we denote by 
jd
int D a
coefficient of modification of 
jd
int V  variable. Then, we can describe the transmission 
mechanism of the stabilizing impulse of 
j
q SFA  mediated as follows:
                                                          
60 It is important to highlight here that inside an “action cell”, for instance, within a level of 
incomes levied for personal taxation, we have a variation of the basis of action (of the taxation 
basis) but this variation doesn’t reach the critical threshold which generates the variation of the 
rate of action; therefore, within this “action cell”, AFS acts proportionally to control the 
particular economic variable, thus behaving atypically for an AFS (it doesn’t verifies the 
sufficient predicate  P S , therefore it is not a genuine AFS). 
61 We denoted by 
qj
0 k  the rate of action of 
j
q AFS  at the moment immediately prior to reaching 
threshold
j
i t , and by 
qj
i dk  we denoted the variation of the rate of action of 
j
q AFS  generated 
by reaching the particular threshold. The negative algebraic sign in the formula is required by 
the verification of the sufficient predicate  A S .
62 Since AFS has no intrinsic procedure to “recognise” the quality of the economic variable on 
which it acts, any AFS will “consider” that the variable on which it acts is the final economic 
variable. It results that the AFS classification into mediated and non-mediated is not an 
operational methodological classification, but rather a classification of interest  just for the 
analyst.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Figure 4 shows the graphic representation of the mediated transmission mechanism 
of AFS stabilization impulse. 
Figure 4 
General (i.e. mediated) transmission mechanism of AFS stabilising 
impulse
Final remarks 
The need to minimize and enhance the government intervention into the economy and 
society (ethics means autonomy, as it is well known) and the need to ensure 
sustainability of economic processes imply that the public policies of adjustment 
become more non-discretionary, which requires reducing the weight of discretionary 
macroeconomic adjustment and introduction of automatic stabilizers into the 
economy. Automatic fiscal stabilizers provide non-discretionary government interven-
tion in the real economy, delivering feedback regulation, with the lowest public cost 
and highest efficiency in terms of speed and settlement assistance. Sufficient and 
necessary attributes of automatic fiscal stabilizers identified in the study could help 
design comprehensive, coherent and consistent automatic fiscal stabilizers to be 
taken for the institutional structure of national tax policies at national as well as at 
European level.
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Appendix 1
Pro-cyclical policies vs. anti-cyclical policies 
The pro-cyclical policy acts as a positive feed-back, while the anti-cyclical policy acts 
as a negative feed-back . We will make the following notations: y: effective output; y:
expected output (normed, usually the potential GDP); G : output gap;  y y    G ; G
~
:
direction of influence, through the public policy of adjustment, of the output gap 
( 0
~
! G  if we want to increase the output gap, and  0
~
 G  if we want to decrease the 
output gap). We may then say that we have a anti-cyclical policy if  0
~
 G  G  and we 
have a pro-cyclical policy  if  0
~
! G  G : Discretionary Policy versus Non-Discretionary Policy 
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Appendix 2
Effect of the automatic fiscal analyzers 